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**CONSTRUCTING GLOBAL 'WARS WITHOUT END':
Vocabularies of Motive and the Structure of Permanent War**

Abstract

My purpose in this paper is to link the larger social context that structurally necessitates 'wars without end' perpetrated by the U.S. elite with the rhetoric that legitimizes them so as to sociologically situate the rhetoric, the vocabularies of motive within a historically formed war-centric social structure that reveals an easily discernible pattern in the use of language. I consider Franklin D. Roosevelt's speech of December 8, 1941 announcing U.S. entry into World War II to be the rhetorical "Master Frame," the blueprint in this regard that was subsequently incorporated by later presidents to justify all wars without end. I compared dissected components of this rhetorical Master Frame to war speeches made by different U.S. presidents in the pre- and post-World War II era to reveal the qualitative difference between war rhetoric of a peace-time social structure where war is an aberration and the permanent war based social structure of the post-World War II U.S., when war became the taken for granted norm.

Keywords

Military Industrial Complex; Permanent War; Rhetoric.

But now that war has become seemingly total and seemingly permanent...Every man and every nation is either friend or foe, and the idea of enmity becomes mechanical, massive, and without genuine passion... (C. Wright Mills 1956:206)

Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists... (President George Bush 2001a)

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The U.S. power elite² never settled after World War II to the idea of converting their booming war-time, war-footing economy into a peace-time economy (Mills 1956; Melman 1974). War had been the ultimate rescuer of the capitalist system from collapse. The Great Depression had forced the political economy to incorporate socialist props (of the New Deal)³ into a capitalist system to manage its contradictions. The thirties therefore, according to C. Wright Mills, were a 'political decade' (Mills 1956:273), in that the power of industry was supplemented through need, by the state that forced itself into the hitherto economic power structure. Despite such "socialistic" state intervention in the economy, the economy remained sluggish and unemployment in the pre-war period was around 19% ("United States Unemployment Rate"). War time production reduced unemployment drastically, to slightly over 1% ("United States Unemployment Rate"), which was a record low.⁴ Not only were the unemployed given jobs, but previously largely unemployable groups (women and racial minorities) were for the first time incorporated into non-traditional segments of the labor force. As the post-war economic boom revealed, the New Deal that was distasteful as a long term solution to the power elite (Mills 1948) could be successively done away with, having no relevance to system survival anymore given the direct injection of government Keynesian spending to the military industrial sector through war based spending (Baran and Sweezy 1966). Domestic growth could be sustained at a much higher level, compared to the New Deal, through internationalized war production and spending, provided war would be more than a short term affair. The enhanced power of the state and the resulting New Deal bureaucracy was relatively easily converted to manage a 'permanent war economy' (Mills 1956; Melman 1974; Hooks 1991), with the added benefit of the U.S. dominating the post war industrial market, its industry emerging unscathed and largely expanded due to the war effort. It was this emphasis into internationalized war production, which started before the entry of the U.S. into World War II (WWII henceforth), admitted by President Roosevelt in his speech on December 9, 1941⁵ (Silberstein 2002:34), which is the key to understanding the sociological significance of not only U.S. entry into that war, but the cultural legitimation sought thereafter for every 'war without end' conducted by the U.S. After initially reducing military spending by 90% in the first two years after WWII, war time production began again with the Cold War shortly thereafter. U.S. entry into WWII also marks the key to understanding the new role of the military and civilian "warlords" as they were incorporated into the power equation that describes the current U.S. power structure (Mills 1956: 275).⁶

² From C. Wright Mills's *Power Elite* (1956) where those at the pinnacles of the economic, military and political institutions rule America through an uneasy alliance post-World War II, involving interchangeability of position and the resulting social cohesion and 'class consciousness,' in an economic structure defined by 'permanent war' and a militaristic ideology, "The Military Metaphysic."

³ For a summary of New Deal programs see: <http://home.earthlink.net/~gfeldmeth/chart.newdeal.html>, retrieved September 30, 2009.

⁴ Helped in part by the military absorbing a large percent of the labor force, around 12 million (Higgs 1992:43).

⁵ The significant quote from the speech reads, "[p]recious months were gained by sending vast quantities of our war material to the nations of the world still able to resist Axis aggression. Our policy rested on the fundamental truth that the defense of any country resisting Hitler or Japan was in the long run the defense of our own country" (Silberstein 2002:34).

⁶ Mills writes, "[i]n so far as the structural clue to the power elite today lies in the enlarged and military state, the clue becomes evident in the military ascendancy. The warlords have gained decisive political relevance, and the military structure of America is not in considerable part a political structure" (Mills 1956:275).

It is my purpose in this paper to link the larger social context that necessitates wars without end with the rhetoric that legitimizes them so as to sociologically situate that rhetoric into easily discernible patterns that are “institutionally determined and institutionally embedded” (Reisigl 2008:254). Given its political nature, presidential war rhetoric is associated with themes involving justice or injustice as well as honor or reprehensibility (Reisigl 2008:244). Call-to-arms speeches, that I analyze in this paper, involve moral panics, the politics of fear (involving the potential for random violence), and a marked separation between victim and perpetrator (the positive-self and negative-other presentation [van Dijk 1993]). They make extensive use of metaphors, which are most effective when presented in “semantic relations of contrast” (Charteris-Black 2005:197). As a result, war related rhetoric is built upon images of the dangerous outsider, images that are drawn from the exiting cultural repertoire that typify the villain to supplement an originating shocking event. It is a form of ideological struggle with “the enemy” that takes on a linguistic form (Charteris-Black 2005:57). The use of moral shocks by the elite through visual and verbal rhetoric, networked through the media, is extremely effective in getting grass roots support for their cause. This is done through “framing mechanisms that drive the questions, interests and values that shape a society” (Giroux 2011). It is in the non-availability of other social networks of the kind that exist between the elites of different countries, for example, that the media becomes an indispensable tool that manufactures consent for elite initiated agendas (Jasper and Poulsen 1995). The prognosis that follows the various grounds and warrants for war involves a linking of U.S. domestic concerns with international events and wars, a formula that is qualitatively different (as I demonstrate below) to the rhetoric associated with wars before WWII. The focus of a permanent war economy is linked to international events, to enemies abroad and therefore, in a militarized social structure, foreign enemies and affairs related to them predominate national consciousness in the affairs of the state.

Using this formula, war in the post-WWII era, unlike past wars, was converted into an end by itself rather than a means to an end (in other words, wars ceased to be instrumental and became ends by themselves through socio-structural precedent) and involved what can be described as ‘total war.’ Total war involves not only the use of the military in the traditional sense, it involves what is best described as “the economics of a military state” (Spiegel 1940:718) as well as a ‘nation at arms,’ in that the entire social structure is militarized and no longer limited to combatants only (Janowitz 1975; Lowry 1970:4-5). The journey metaphor (Charteris-Black 2005) in political war speeches attempts just such a totalizing of war by taking the public as a “fellow traveling companion” (Charteris-Black 2005:57) in the war effort.

A permanent war economy involves fostering private investment together with a continual preparation for war (Spiegel 1940:718). The *laissez faire* economy is replaced by a centrally planned economy (Higgs 1992:55) where several motivating emotions, including “fear, obedience and patriotic enthusiasm” (Spiegel 1940:718), supplement the workings of an accumulations regime. It is the cultural legitimation sought due to structural precedent that defines what Benford (1993) refers to as ‘collective action frames’ that build consensus and therefore serve as tools for mobilization, in this case mobilization of the citizenry for wars without end. It is my claim that those frames, based upon which war rhetoric is structured, have remained consistently uniform post-WWII, and that they are qualitatively different to the pre-WWII rhetorical schemata. This reveals to us indirectly that the social structure defined by permanent war has in fact remained intact in the post-WWII era, which

marked a significant structural break from the previous Keynesian welfare based system.

The ongoing militarized nature of the U.S. political economy can be discerned objectively by noting the historical trend of discretionary government spending on defense post WWII, which has been greater on average than the amounts spent by the government, both Democratic and Republican regimes in the U.S. on all other programs combined for most of that period. President Obama's (discretionary) budget proposal for defense (in 2010) sought \$663.7 Billion (\$533.7 Billion plus \$130 Billion supplemental), which was higher than what was approved by Congress for 2009 (Gershon 2009). Therefore, regardless of the individual who occupies the office of the executive or the peace rhetoric following unpopular wars that might win elections, the structure of permanent war continues.⁷ The militarization of the political economy can also be accessed through the concentration of scientific research and development in the military sector ("One-third of all scientists and technicians work on Department of Defense projects") as well as the penetration of military men to high level positions within the aerospace defense industries (Silverstein 1998)⁸ as well as the state.

In order to maintain a permanent war economy as the new structural reality, post WWII, the military metaphysic (Mills 1956), or the military definition of reality became hegemonic and was objectively mainstreamed using the cultural repertoire already available (Williams 1995; Charteris-Black 2005:10). The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and its eventual institutionalization after the events of September 11, 2001⁹ in the U.S. was similarly achieved using master symbols (Gerth and Mills 1964:277),¹⁰ religious, moral and patriotic, within the same 'vocabularies of motive' (Mills 1940) that legitimized the entry of the United States into WWII. The use of these master symbols forms the substance of the theme of phraseology in discourse analysis. These phrases are often used and reused in speeches to create 'cross-speaker cohesion' (Chilton and Schaffner 2002:37). Language, according to the critical discourse analysis perspective, is a vehicle for "establishing differences in power in hierarchical social structures" (Wodak and Meyer 2009:10). Since vocabularies of motive, according to C. Wright Mills (Mills 1940),¹¹ can be located within specific histories and societal structures (see Figure 1), if I can demonstrate that the WWII vocabularies of war rhetoric have remained consistent, based on what I describe as the rhetorical 'Master Frame' (based on Snow and Benford 1992),¹² for

⁷ Non-discretionary (mandatory) spending increase over the years reflects pre-WWII formulas and is due to population/demographic issues. It is not subject to annual review and should not be added to discretionary spending to show a deflated amount of military spending, in order to keep comparisons valid. See: "A People's Guide to The Federal Budget" (2011).

⁸ *Mother Jones* reviewed the remaining files, located in seven large storage boxes at the National Archives, and found that between 1992 and 1995, 3,288 people from the Pentagon and the armed forces went to work for the defense industry. Of those, 2,482 were officers with the rank of colonel or higher (Silverstein 1998).

⁹ Denoted as 9/11 henceforward.

¹⁰ Gerth and Mills wrote, "[t]hose in authority within institutions and social structures attempt to justify their rule by linking it, as if it were a necessary consequence, with moral symbols, sacred emblems, or legal formulae which are widely believed and deeply internalized (by the masses)" (1964:277).

¹¹ Mills wrote: "[m]otives are of no value apart from the delimited societal situations for which they are the appropriate vocabularies. They must be situated...Motives vary in content and character with historical epochs and societal structures" (1940).

See: <http://pubpages.unh.edu/~jds/Mills%201940.htm>, retrieved February 9, 2009.

¹² A frame, according to Snow and Benford, is "an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the «world out there» by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences and sequences of actions within one's present or past environments" (1992:137).

constructing wars without end ever since, it would be *prima facie* evidence that the military dominated economic structure of the U.S. has remained more or less intact. It is because these vocabularies are associated with those in positions of power within the U.S., they are war speeches by the political elite. Their purpose is to stress continuity and stability and “an essential component of sameness” (Chilton and Schaffner 2002:73) in a societal structure.

Several theoretical perspectives, at various levels of analysis lend credibility to this mode of research. For example, such research is termed as ‘sociology proper’ by Niklas Luhmann in his *General Systems Theory* (Ritzer 2008:209).¹³ Semantics, according to Luhmann, being “socially available sense that is generalized on a higher level and relatively independent of specific situations” (quoted by Moeller 2006:51). Socio-linguistic discourse analysis can help us look at “the complex dialectical relations between semiotic (cultural) and non-semiotic (structural/institutional) elements” (Wodak and Meyer 2009:183), since language is, in the final analysis, the symbolic representation of the social ecology of people’s existence. This type of research is also legitimated by the Symbolic Interactionists’ study of claims as ‘formula stories’ (Loseke 2003) that are based on public narratives in that changing plots and changing morality evaluations (deciphered via historical/comparative studies), which can quite possibly reveal altered underlying structures and social forces (Loseke 2000:47, 2003:89). Restated in the language of Mertonian structural functionalism (Merton 1968:73-138), I am implying that the latent content of the narrative is distinct from its manifest content and can be deciphered by its functions located in the concrete action that follows thereafter. It can therefore be potentially “translated” after the action has taken place.




Figure.1 The Socio-Structural anchoring of Vocabularies of Motive
Source: self-reported data (based on Mills [1940:904-913])

¹³ According to Luhmann, a sound knowledge of society can be obtained by “observing the semantics of the self-descriptions of society” (Ritzer 2008:210).

Perspective

The history that accompanies the rhetorical frames of wars without end typically prologues with what is described to the public as a pointless horrific event (“suddenly and deliberately attacked” as in the WWII presidential rhetoric). The pointlessness of the event is revealed by such official questions as, “Why do they hate us?” (President Bush after 9/11 regarding what Americans must be wondering [Bush 2001e]). The horrific event is presented as being perpetrated by dangerous outsiders (“bandits” [WWII presidential rhetoric] or “outlaw regimes” [9/11 presidential rhetoric]). The horrific event itself stands out in the narration as a world-changing event (“a date which will live in infamy” [Roosevelt 1941a]) or “the night fell on a different world” [Bush 2001a]). The horrific event is clearly depicted in the official rhetorical script of all wars without end starting with WWII: Pearl Harbor, later the Gozenko Affair¹⁴ or the 1947 Polish elections (that resulted in communist control of Poland) in the case of the Cold War, and 9/11 that began the GWOT. Even though relatively minor incidents by themselves in the history of global warfare (and politics), these horrific events are presented as world changing in an ethnocentric manner, part of the elite discourse of (coded) racism (van Dijk 1993). The frame delineated above is in stark contrast to the rhetorical frames that justified U.S. entry into wars before WWII. The clear separation between domestic and foreign concerns that was evident in previous wars is absent in the promotion of wars without end (the U.S. assumed hegemony in the global system post-World War II). Also evident is the absence of an instrumental need to conduct war for a specified end (the end is generalized not specified in the WWII frame) and the precipitating horrific event that marks the U.S. entry into the war.

U.S. Entry into World War II

America’s entry into WWII was preceded by the Great Depression of the 1930s in which the country’s focus was on domestic affairs. Most Americans were anti-war, preferring individual responsibility, non interference and self-preservation over sending their children abroad to fight foreign wars. According to Stinnett (2001:7), “[o]pinion polls in the 1940s indicated that a majority of Americans did not want the country involved in Europe’s wars.”¹⁵ Isolationism seemed to be the dominant ethos with good contextual reasons. Many believed that the U.S.’ entry into World War I was a mistake, a view reflected by the U.S. Congress. A Senate committee headed by Gerald P. Nye investigating the reasons for entering World War I, concluded that bankers and munitions makers, for their profit motive, pushed America to war (Whitfield 2004:22). It was thus recognized by the U.S. Senate that World War I was instrumental, a means to an end, the end being the profit motive of the “bankers and munitions makers.” It was because of such anti-war sentiments, overshadowed by the Great Depression, that the Neutrality Act of 1935¹⁶ was passed, which banned

¹⁴ On September 5, 1945 Igor Gouzenko, a Soviet defector, revealed, through 109 stolen documents, the existence of a Soviet spy ring in Canada leading to hundreds of arrests. Gouzenko’s defection became a big media event and led in part to the start of the Cold War. See: “The Gouzenko Affair,” http://archives.cbc.ca/politics/national_security/topics/72/, retrieved February 12, 2009.

¹⁵ According to Stinnett, “[a] Gallup Poll taken in early September showed that 88 percent of Americans agreed with the views of an isolationist bloc, led by aviation hero Chalres Lindbergh and industrialist Henry Ford that advocated staying away from Europe’s wars” (Stinnett 2001:17).

¹⁶ See: Neutrality Act of 1935, <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/interwar/neutralityact.htm>, retrieved February 15, 2009.

shipment of war materials to belligerents and forbade U.S. citizens from travelling on belligerent ships. The Act was amended in 1936 to prohibit loans to belligerents and in 1937 to include participation in belligerent “civil wars.” Gerald P. Nye writing in 1939 reflected this isolationist sentiment when he wrote:

[a]s between a so-called «collective security,» the terms of which have never yet been clearly defined..., I prefer the policy of neutrality – the planned intention of keeping out of other people’s wars. (1939)¹⁷

A drastic change from this ethos of isolationism began with the passage of the 1939 revision of the Neutrality Act, which allowed weapons to be delivered on a “cash and carry” basis to belligerents (Douglas and Rubel 2003:99). Worded neutrally, it favored Britain and France who had easier access to American weapons. In fact, the initial lobbying by Franklin D. Roosevelt for the repeal of the requirements of the Neutrality Act followed the German invasion of Czechoslovakia.¹⁸ This move was considered by Germany to be an entry of the U.S. into war against it, a point later reflected in Germany’s declaration of war on the U.S. (Stinnett 2001).

Constructing World Wars

In describing wars without end as World Wars based on the ‘diagnostic frames’ (Loseke 2003) that were used by the elite to mark the U.S.’ entry into WWII as well as the objective global arena in which they play out, we can possibly conceptualize, in my opinion, that almost immediately after WWII ended (1945), World War III began.¹⁹ World War III (which ended in 1989 with the Malta Summit) (“1989: Malta Summit Ends Cold War”) was mostly a cold war or a series of proxy wars, limited warfare and counterinsurgency where not only the U.S., but the world was militarized and divided into warring camps. Smaller skirmishes between these warring camps involved ‘terrorists *versus* freedom fighters,’ where one side’s terrorist was another’s freedom fighter (Heiner 2005), the scope of war however was global. The Cold War (World War III) was a continuous war, a war without end or a total war. When World War III ended (or fizzled out with the collapse of the Soviet Union), World War IV was required through structural precedent in order to reproduce a war-time economy, as previously noted. Therefore, in the interim period itself, the first Gulf War against Saddam Hussein, saw the largest collection of U.S. forces for a war with an enemy that wasn’t presented as a communist. This war, which built up Saddam Hussein as a formidable threat to the United States and its allies, aimed at countering the pressure to reduce military budgets post-Cold War (Gordon 1990).²⁰ However, this

¹⁷ See: Nye (1939) “Is Neutrality Possible for America?,”

<http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/interwar/nye.htm>, retrieved February 8, 2009.

¹⁸ See: Revision of the Neutrality Act, <http://histclo.com/essay/war/WWII/cou/us/pr/40/rna39.html>, retrieved February 8, 2009.

¹⁹ As early as March 1946, Winston Churchill was talking about an Iron curtain descending over Europe. The Soviets didn’t want a hostile regime in Poland because they were twice attacked by Germany through the Polish Corridor, which became a point of contention for the U.S/Britain. See: “Cold War,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/cold_war.htm, retrieved February 16, 2009.

²⁰ The Pentagon’s blueprint for United States military strategy in the 1990’s was released in August 1990 and mentioned new threats from Iraq (Gordon 1990).

stage-setting war, picked upon the earlier construction of terrorist *versus* freedom fighters in structuring a “new world order,” as claimed by President Bush (1991).²¹

The same networks that had bled the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, the so-called Mujahedeen, a group that was made victorious through U.S. military support at great human cost (“Death Tolls for the Major Wars and Atrocities of the Twentieth Century”)²² and their associated foreign faction (the Arab Afghans), were constructed as the new enemy. It is worth noting here that these so-called Arab-Afghans who were imported from foreign lands into Pakistan by the U.S.-Saudi alliance during this proxy Cold War and who later assumed “ownership”²³ of the conflict, in Gusfieldian terms (Gusfield 1984:13), even though they never amounted to more than 3000 fighters, were then given by the U.S., a constructed grievance as well as a moral victory as resistors among their local populations by the setting up of U.S. military bases in Saudi Arabia (“U.S. Pulls Out of Saudi Arabia” 2003). During the Afghan-Soviet war, other than the fact that what became Al Qaeda was a U.S.-Saudi creation for channeling arms, money and at the most 3000 Arab volunteers (that became the infamous Arab Afghans in the Afghan-Soviet war), it had little recognition or military value with the local Mujahedeen, according to most experts on the issue.²⁴ As late as September 24, 2001, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) of the Pentagon in its report stated that Al-Qaeda had neither integrated with the Afghans or the Taliban (Raman 2003).²⁵ Similarly, post 9/11 caricature of what became the symbolic representation of the villain, the suicide bomber, was given by the U.S. media to those motivated by Islamic religious ideology, even though such a representation of the suicide bomber, while culturally popular, is inaccurate according to sociologist Robert Pape, who states:

[t]he data show that there is little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, or any one of the world’s religions...what nearly all suicide attacks have in common is a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland... (2005:2)

With no major enemies in sight that could challenge the military might of the United States, and a permanent war economy deeply pressured to dismantle, an enemy with global reach had to be constructed (Fromkin 1985; Schoenfeld 1996).²⁶

²¹ George Bush (senior), announcing Gulf War I to the American public, January 16, 1991: “This is an historic moment...We have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world order – a world where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations...” See: <http://www.historyplace.com/speeches/bush-war.htm>, retrieved February 13, 2009. Also see: Jenkins (2006:284-291).

²² Afghan casualty estimates average at around 1.5 million. See: <http://necrometrics.com/20c1m.htm>, retrieved February 15, 2009. The Soviet Union lost 13,310 soldiers. See: Taubman (1988).

²³ How Bin Laden and his Arab Afghans claim victory over the Soviet Union reveals this ownership they have assumed over that war, which was to prove very useful to the U.S. power elite in constructing Bin Laden as a formidable foe.

²⁴ Sageman writes, “[c]ontemporaneous accounts of the war do not even mention the Afghan Arabs. Many were not serious about the war...Very few were involved in actual fighting” (2004:57–58).

²⁵ The report states “[e]ventually, the Taliban and al-Qaeda will war with each other. The weakness of both is in the minds of the individuals that belong to the groups and in the power that is given to them by their names...” Raman (2003).

²⁶ As creator and director of the policy planning staff of the Department of State in 1947, George Kennan designed the U.S. Cold War containment policy against the Soviet Union. In 1987 he said: “[w]ere the Soviet Union to sink tomorrow under the waters of the ocean, the American military-industrial establishment would have to go on, substantially unchanged, until some other adversary

Here, we see that a similar 'collective action frame' (Benford 1993; Loseke 2003) was used: just like in World War III (the Cold War), an ally with a preexisting caricature of otherness, like the Soviet Union who were allied fascist fighters in WWII, were transformed into the communist menace with an Iron Curtain threatening the liberty and freedom of the "civilized world,"²⁷ so also the Mujahedeen "freedom fighters" ("Charlie Wilson's War" 2007) were now converted to the terrorist Al-Qaida and their Taliban sympathizers. Once constructed, there was a deliberate escalation and mainstreaming of "the enemy" through discursive and material provocation (as in the case of the 2003 Iraq war) to build them up by giving them major enemy status (and implying that Iraq was "Al Qaeda central," when it hardly had any Al Qaeda presence in the territory controlled by Saddam Hussein). The corresponding self-fulfilling prophecy of moral support of the populations of the countries they operate in was accomplished through advertising events like the Abu Ghraib prison atrocities, and disregard for the religious sensitivities of deeply religious populations, supposedly leaked by the mainstream media. Once the opponent was built up (the Soviet Union in the case of World War III, and Al Qaeda [and the Taliban] in case of World War IV), this factory-made World War developed a momentum of its own, helping to maintain the economic structure of continuous war, processed and nurtured through cultural legitimacy, moral panics and the politics of fear (Altheide 2006).

Methodology

For the purpose of this study, I analyzed presidential *State of the Union* addresses, presidential war announcements and other war related presidential speeches. The audience of these speeches is either the American public or U.S. members of Congress. I began by analyzing President Franklin D. Roosevelt's December 8, 1941 speech announcing U.S. entry into World War II, against the "Empire of Japan." I consider this speech to be the rhetorical Master Frame (Snow and Benford 1992) that was subsequently utilized in form by later presidents to justify all wars without end. I then compared dissected components of this Master Frame speech to the rhetorical frames used by President Harry Truman regarding the Cold War and that used by President George W. Bush to justify the GWOT as well as Winston Churchill's famous call-to-arms speech of May 13, 1940. I also compared this Master Frame with Woodrow Wilson's 1917 World War I speech to show the qualitative difference between the 'war to end all wars' (as World War I was framed) and 'wars without end' that signify the post WWII era. The data was limited to publicly available U.S. presidential speeches and addresses as stated above. The framework for analyzing claims-making rhetoric for constructing wars without end was the one outlined by Joel Best (1987:101-121), based on Toulmin's categories of argumentation involving grounds, warrants and conclusions. Toulmin outlined his schema of argument analysis through claims, grounds, warrants, backing, modal qualifications and possible rebuttals (1984:25).

Together with Toulmin's schema, I also rely on positive-self and negative-other presentations in these speeches as outlined by van Dijk (1993) regarding elite discourse and racism involving immigrants and refugees in which he states:

could be invented. Anything else would be an unacceptable shock to the American economy." See: Fromkin (1985) and Schoenfeld (1996).

²⁷ Winston Churchill's March 5, 1946 speech following the end of World War II in which he talks of an Iron Curtain to describe the new division between the West and the Soviet Union. See: Churchill (1946).

combination of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation may regularly be read about in debates about immigrants and refugees where conflicting ideologies of humanitarianism and political pragmatism find their expression...[through] invoking what might be called the Fake Refugee Schema...This schema features evaluative propositions... (p. 78-79)

Based on Toulmin's elements of argumentation, after making a basic claim, grounds involve broad definitions of the problems that ground the claim usually through a horrific, attention grabbing example. Grounds involve definitions, which are domain statements that name the phenomenon and establish phenomenon range through including and excluding behavior, people or countries. They usually include a 'representative anecdote' (Benford 1993:195), used as a form within which vocabularies of motive are constructed. In addition to domain statements, orientation statements involve interpreting an existing problem in new ways so as to discover it. Orientation statements are associative statements. Behind such associative moments of discovery are interests shaped by the larger socio-historical context. Grounds also define the scope of the perceived problem, which involves official statistics, severity and growth potential. Warrants, in Toulmin's scheme involve 'fields of arguments' (Best 1987:108), the different types, that is rational, legal or geometric that are used together with values, and provide the reasons to justify the conclusion (or prognosis) involving a call-to-arms (Benford 1993:199). Warrants take the form of "laws of nature, legal principles and statutes, rules of thumb, engineering formulas, and so on" (Toulmin 1984:26).

The values that are used in warrants are picked from a preexisting 'cultural repertoire' (Williams 1995:125) and often involve the victim being viewed as blameless (positive-self presentation), but having agency (Dunn 2004) in being able to retaliate and present the villain's actions (negative other presentation) being "pointless and without pattern" (Best 1999:10). The values used (in the U.S. context) involve historical continuity (old time culture) to appeal to conservative members of the audience, while talking about rights and freedoms to appeal to liberals. Conclusions wrap up the identified problem, take note of qualifiers, which outline the degree of certainty of the argument in various scenarios, and adjust for possible rebuttals (Toulmin 1984). The conclusion establishes the justifications for seeing the condition as a problem with a call to action, for instance, what can be done to alleviate the problem. For conclusions to be effective they must be presented with urgency (i.e., needing immediate action), be efficacious (i.e., intervention will produce the desired effect), and proper (i.e., must not violate the values used in the warrants) (Benford 1993:195).

In the period leading to and after WWII, presidential rhetoric made use of moral panics. Moral panics are defined by Eric Goode and Ben-Yehuda as:

the behavior of some members of a society (or World System) is thought to be...so wounding to the substance and fabric of the body social that serious steps must be taken to control the behavior, punish the perpetrators, and repair the damage. (1994:31)

Social indicators like a heightened level of concern for the problem (objectively displayed in the GWOT by Homeland Security Advisory System's multicolored Terror Alert Scale), an increased level of hostility towards the perpetrators of the behavior, widespread consensus of the threat being real and disproportionality, meaning that

the problem is considered much wider than it actually is, can reveal that a moral panic has taken hold in a particular society. Moral panics are also volatile, that is they have a tendency of suddenly erupting and subsiding, while becoming institutionalized over time (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994:33-41). In addition to indicators, we need to be careful of the timing of moral panics, which depends on micro level interests ultimately connected to macro-level moral/value universes. It is possible by use of moral panics to create 'collective delusions,'²⁸ described by Goode and Ben-Yehuda as the "belief aspect of mass hysteria" (1994:111, 185), similar to the collective delusion that made a vast majority of the U.S. population believe that Saddam Hussein was linked to the events of 9/11, or that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction that were a threat to the U.S.²⁹ In short, the purpose of moral panics is to show that a morally intolerable condition exists and something must be done to fix it (Loseke 2003:70).

The structural clue as to how moral panics and collective delusions are made possible is because of value ambivalence due to the public's "social, political and moral fragmentation" (Loseke 2003:10-11). Rapid structural change starting with the Great Depression and thereafter the militarization of the economic structure resulted in a lagging culture that couldn't keep pace with such changes. Grafted atop the "lag" was objectively produced culture, a kind of "system integration" (Habermas 1975) through the corporatized cultural apparatus involving the mass media and formal education.³⁰ This means that old ways of doing things are no longer valid, new norms have not ossified yet and so there is apathy and anxiety, what C. Wright Mills described as an 'unspecified malaise' (1959:11). This gives the elite fertile ground not only to manipulate using the repertoire of a lagging culture, but also to create moral panics by giving specificity to that malaise through their domination of the media of mass communication (see Mills 2002:16); a kind of uneasy peace is constructed at the individual level that is mirrored by the uneasy peace that is characteristic of wars without end, a peace that is always in danger of being breached by the well-advertised horrific consequences in case of potential inaction. These moral panics can then be evoked upon need to launch wars as a solution to all ills, individual and collective.

Emotions also serve as catalyzing supplements to rally mass support. As the U.S. social structure has become increasingly bureaucratized, impersonality, which is a trait of functional rationality, is institutionalized and made universal (Mills 2002:252). This means that the domain of human emotionality shrinks in the mainstream, most emotions get discredited as irrational and therefore, do not produce the desired outrage, in other words a blasé attitude predominates (Simmel 1950).³¹ Emotions form the unconscious mythological counterpart of the conscious ideological component of narratives and are deployed using the metaphor that mediates between the conscious and the unconscious (Charteris-Black 2005:11).

²⁸ A September 2003 poll revealed that nearly 70% of Americans believed that Saddam was personally involved in the 9/11 attacks. See: "Poll: 70% believe in Saddam, 9-11 link" (2003).

²⁹ Snow's analysis of media culture suggest that by linking fear and 'moral panics' to a form of entertainment by the mainstream media, part of the conditioning of which is the periodic 'suspension of disbelief' for the purpose of enjoyment, media culture normalizes belief in the absurd (Snow 1983 in: Altheide 2006:74).

³⁰ Post 9/11, many courses related to terrorism have been incorporated by educational institutions into their curricula and related jobs have been created.

³¹ Simmel wrote, "[t]he same factors which have thus coalesced into the exactness and minute precision of the form of life have coalesced into a structure of the highest impersonality..." See: <http://www.altruists.org/static/files/The%20Metropolis%20and%20Mental%20Life%20%28Georg%20Simmel%29.htm>, retrieved December 3, 2011.

The main emotion associated with the higher institutional orders, the economic, military and political domains, dominated by men is anger, which usually emerges with a perceived loss of power. A loss of status on the other hand results in sadness, an emotion linked with weakness and therefore, by default, relegated to the feminine in a gendered society (Stets and Turner 2008:74-78). We should, as a result in our analysis of the rhetoric, find emotive appeals that evoke both sadness and anger in order to cut across gender lines to a broader cross section of the population since the mobilization of the entire population is required for total war. Similarly, fear, which is the only emotion that evokes instinctual biological survivability in the case of war and terrorism, gives discourse managers great manipulation potential if they are successfully able to link cultural content with it. The 'politics of fear' tries to locate fear within socially situated contexts, a kind of implicit conclusion that guarantees the desired response (Altheide 2006:37).³² Also, identity and integration are an important component of political speeches (Chilton and Schaffner 2002:72). Without emphasizing a common identity through nation, mobilization for war is not possible. Such an integrating identity is conventionally constructed in political speeches through a narrative of community involving well known events from a common political past and a celebration of past achievements (Chilton and Schaffner 2002:135), understood and respected by the audience. Through communicating a 'common symbolic universe,' the micro biographical "sincerity" (Chilton and Schaffner 2002:185) and macro sociological "credibility" are established in political speeches.

Analysis

WWII Rhetorical "Master Frame" and the Attack on Pearl Harbor

*Franklin D. Roosevelt, Declaration of War Speech. December 8, 1941*³³

In diagnosing the problem for his audience, the American people, President Roosevelt defines the problem as an unprovoked and "deliberate" attack by "the Empire of Japan." Stating that the U.S. "was at peace" with Japan and pointing to the deceptive nature of the enemy (the morally suspect villain, negative-other presentation) in misleading the United States (the morally pure victim, positive-self presentation), he defines the scope of the initial horrific event as vast and growing:

[t]he attack...has caused severe damage to American naval and military forces and I regret to tell you that many American lives have been lost, and in addition... (Roosevelt 1941a)

The escalation is emphasized after detailing the list of Japanese atrocities in addition to Pearl Harbor that have extended "throughout the Pacific region." After defining the problem, he provides warrants for it to be considered an "existing" condition by his audience that needs immediate attention. He states his warrant as a

³² The social situatedness of rhetoric can also be discerned by the varying effects it has on audience members based on location. Situated in a connected though varying social structure, international audiences interpreted Bush's Iraq war rhetoric in a markedly different way to U.S. audiences (Altheide 2006:157).

³³ See: Roosevelt (1941a). Note that the time claim of "absolute victory" in the speech is deliberately vague in terms of instrumental objectives that will end the war. What does absolute victory mean when not elaborated upon? The ends are generalized not specified.

foregone conclusion based on “facts,” (“the facts speak for themselves”), which is a kind of ‘disembodiment of interaction’ (Best 1995:23), that detaches the facts leading up to the incident from the actual incident, which is then presented as a “provocative grabber.” The president then adds the cultural theme of nationalism stating that the very life of the nation is at stake. This fits in well with an audience that is morally fragmented: when an appeal to the life of a nation is made, everyone in the audience can interpret the nation based upon their own personal scripts of what America means to them as their country. Nationalism, when symbolically developed, is an equal-opportunity appeal strategy that unites people otherwise divided based on gender, race, class and ideology.

Urgency is emphasized by stating that “our people, our territory and our interests are in grave danger.” Moral purity and appeal to the righteousness of the cause as against the premeditated deception of the enemy and its “unprovoked” attack is emphasized through use of the cultural theme of fair play (Loseke 2003:65). Blamelessness of the U.S. to garnish sympathy from the audience is managed carefully with agency, which is emphasized by promising a fitting response to the enemy ensuring victory (“the American people, in their righteous might, will win through to absolute victory”). This management of the relationship between emotional and cultural requirements therefore creates a positive image of a victim who is wronged, but nonetheless possesses agency, thereby ensuring a form of ‘political empathy’ (Dunn 2004:236). Decontextualizing events (by presenting blame as a foregone conclusion through a horrific example) also accomplishes the maintenance of victim purity in order to prevent any chance of victim blaming or ambiguity about victim precipitation by the audience, in that victims need to meet cultural stereotypes and manage their ‘presentation of self’ (Dunn 2001). Finally, it is claimed that “hostilities exist” meaning a condition is at hand, it threatens the life of the nation, and the prognosis is a war without a foreseeable (nonetheless victorious) end (“[n]o matter how long it may take us to overcome this premeditated invasion, the American people, in their righteous might, will win through to absolute victory”). An analysis of the rhetoric also reveals that there is an appeal made to evoke anger, through loss of power (“[t]he attack yesterday on the Hawaiian Islands has caused severe damage to American naval and military forces”), as well as to evoke sadness (“I regret to tell you that very many American lives have been lost”). As a result, through evoking varied emotions, both men and women are being addressed for support according to the gendered structure of how emotions are “accomplished” (or “done”) (West and Zimmerman 1987) in U.S. society.

In summarizing the above Master Frame speech, the grounds used for U.S. entry into WWII involved a clear identification of a villain (the Empire of Japan) and examples of its many atrocities (that are imaged as random and escalating), a righteous, morally pure victim (the United States), with warrants established through moral panics, a condition that is intolerable, involving threat to the life of the nation (without details that might divide the public), using cultural themes of nationalism and fair play, with a prognosis or conclusion of a war (without any predetermined end) being a necessity to fix the intolerable condition and neutralize the villain (the Empire of Japan), *via* “absolute victory” or “inevitable triumph.” It should be noted, however, that this declaration of war was not without significant preparation of the American public for war long before the attacks on Pearl Harbor, and that this case-closing speech merely represented a culmination of the earlier indirect preparation.³⁴

³⁴ Robert Stinnett writes in *Day of Deceit*, “[a]n audience in Great Smoky Mountain National Park in Tennessee cheered and applauded when FDR asked for American preparedness against, the

Analysis of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's address broadcast nationally from the White House and over a World-Wide Hookup³⁵ on December 9, 1941.³⁶

In the section of this “fireside chat”³⁷ with the American People (referenced in the endnotes), President Roosevelt summarizes the grounds for the U.S.’ entry into WWII, identifies a villain (“criminal attacks perpetrated by the Japanese”) and reminds the audience that the initiating event was not the doing of the United States (“the challenge has now been flung at the United States”), which is the morally pure victim of the attacks. The attack by Japan is described as random, immoral and potentially escalating (“sudden criminal attacks,” “decade of international immorality,” “powerful and resourceful gangsters”). There is an appeal to the emotion of sadness (involving loss of life) and to anger due to loss of power in instrumental terms (ships and airplanes destroyed). There is a use of cultural themes of nationalism (“all that this nation represents”) and fair play (“which would be fair and honorable to every nation”).

It is worth noting that the initial event is used by the president as justification for expanding the war to a war not only against Japan, but against Germany and Italy as well (“if we accomplished that and found that the rest of the world was dominated by Hitler and Mussolini”). Similar expansion using the initial events of September 11, 2001 within a similar rhetorical frame was used by George Bush to launch the Iraq war in 2003, as well as by Harry Truman earlier to expand the Cold War beyond the Korean War theatre. Also, the merging of international and domestic causes in the chat are noteworthy (“but, in representing our cause, we represent theirs as well”), this, as I will show later was a major shift from the rhetorical frames of U.S. wars before WWII. It involved the deployment of a new metaphor, that of the U.S. as ‘moral leader’ (Charteris-Black 2005:177).

greatest attack that has ever been launched against freedom of the individual. We must prepare beforehand not afterward” (2001:25–26).

³⁵ See: Silberte in (2002:30).

³⁶ “My Fellow Americans: The sudden criminal attacks perpetrated by the Japanese in the Pacific provide the climax of a decade of international immorality. Powerful and resourceful gangsters have banded together to make war upon the whole human race. Their challenge has now been flung at the United States of America...Many American soldiers and sailors have been killed by enemy action. American ships have been sunk; American airplanes have been destroyed. ...We expect to eliminate the danger from Japan, but it would serve us ill if we accomplished that and found that the rest of the world was dominated by Hitler and Mussolini. So we are going to win the war and we are going to win the peace that follows...we will know that the vast majority of the members of the human race are on our side...” (Roosevelt 1941b).

³⁷ See: “Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Fireside Chats”, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/fireside.php>, retrieved March 15, 2009.

The Cold War: WWII Rhetorical Frame and the Cold War

*Harry Truman, State of the Union address January 6, 1947*³⁸

In this 1947 *State of the Union* address (referenced in the endnotes), President Harry Truman presents similar grounds for maintaining military strength, as were used by President Roosevelt in the rhetorical Master Frame above, for instance, the possibility of a “sudden” attack, with warrants established through moral panics of again inviting attack through weakness, an implicit reference to Pearl Harbor, if nothing was done (similar to the post 9/11 officially provided imagery of a “mushroom cloud” in reference to nuclear attack in one of America’s cities if nothing was done about Iraq [see Bush 2002]). What is notable in this speech is that even though the Soviet Union is identified as a belligerent, no direct reference is made to starting a war against it. The focus of attention, as in WWII, is international (“our goal is collective security for all mankind”).³⁹ We can conclude from this that the nation was being prepared for another international war without end, though not yet explicitly declared. That declaration had to wait for the war in Korea.

*President Harry Truman's speech on the Korean War, April 11, 1951*⁴⁰

In this speech (referenced in the endnotes), there is a clear identification of a villain (“the Communists in the Kremlin”), the grounds for U.S. entry into WWII similarly identified a villain (“criminal attacks perpetrated by the Japanese”). President Truman reminds the audience that to do nothing would be to invite “foreign attack,” in other words, similar to President Roosevelt’s claim that the initiating event (Pearl Harbor) was not the doing of the United States (the victim of aggression) that had to respond (“the challenge has now been flung at the United States”) for the sake of its survival. The war in Korea is plugged by Harry Truman as a war of aggression by the Soviet Union that wants to make the U.S., its “principal victim.” The war in Korea is described as immoral and potentially escalating (“monstrous conspiracy”), which is quite similar to how President Roosevelt described Japan (“international immorality,” “powerful and resourceful gangsters”). There is an appeal to the emotion of anger due to loss of power (“picked off one by one”) similar to the appeal to anger in instrumental terms by President Roosevelt in the WWII rhetorical Master Frame (“ships and airplanes destroyed”). The initial war in Korea is used as justification for expanding the war to Indochina and beyond (“helping the forces of freedom now fighting in Indochina and other countries”), similar to how President Roosevelt used

³⁸ “The delay in arriving at the first peace settlements is due partly to the difficulty of reaching agreement with the Soviet Union on the terms of settlement...[break]...This is an age when unforeseen attack could come with unprecedented speed. We must be strong enough to defeat, and thus forestall, any such attack...When a system of collective security under the United Nations has been established, we shall be willing to lead in collective disarmament, but, until such a system becomes a reality, we must not again allow ourselves to become weak and invite attack...But we have a higher duty and a greater responsibility than the attainment of our own national security. Our goal is collective security for all mankind.” See: Truman (1947).

³⁹ This loss of focus once the global war has started is similar to the war against Al-Qaeda not remaining the main U.S. focus after the initial U.S. war on Afghanistan in 2001, the focus became more generalized towards a global war against Islamic terrorism so that now Al-Qaeda is almost non-existent as a major enemy in the mainstream press.

⁴⁰ “The Communists in the Kremlin are engaged in a monstrous conspiracy to stamp out freedom all over the world. If they were to succeed, the United States would be numbered among their principal victims. It must be clear to everyone that the United States cannot and will not sit idly by and await foreign conquest...They want to control all Asia from the Kremlin...” See: Truman (1951a).

Pearl Harbor to advocate an expansion of the war against Japan to war with Germany and Italy. This escalation is emphasized after detailing a list of Soviet atrocities, in addition to Korea that include “all of Asia,” similar to how Roosevelt listed Japanese atrocities, “[extending] throughout the Pacific region.”

*President Harry Truman, State of the Union Address January 8, 1951*⁴¹

The WWII rhetorical Master Frame is again evident in this 1951 *State of the Union* address (referenced in the endnotes) where the nation is introduced to similar grounds used for the U.S.’ entry into WWII, that is the possibility of a “sudden” attack, with warrants established through moral panics, the focus is internationalized and the threat is presented as “total” in scope and horrific in consequence. The use of the cultural theme of individualism/freedom is also evident (“and above all, we cherish liberty”). The part about the “good start” seems to be the exact same as Roosevelt’s December 9, 1941 speech that talks about a good start before the official U.S. entry in World War II, in the initial war material supplies that were made for Great Britain:

[p]recious months were gained by sending vast quantities of our war material to the nations of the world still able to resist Axis aggression...
(Roosevelt 1941b)

President Truman in the 1951 *State of the Union* address clearly identifies the villain as “the Soviet dictatorship” and its sinister aim of “world conquest.” War is given preference to domestic concerns by the president; international affairs are translated as being crucial to U.S. national security (Truman states, “the gun that points at them points at us, also. The threat is a total threat and the danger is a common danger”).

Comparison with World War I

Qualitative difference in war rhetoric: The pre-World War II rhetorical frame

On December 6, 1904, Theodore Roosevelt, the 26th president of the United States, while commenting on expanding the Monroe Doctrine,⁴² incorporating “international police power”⁴³ for the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere, stated in an address to Congress the grounds for international intervention implying a preference for U.S. interests in instrumental terms.⁴⁴ While not ignoring intervention where such

⁴¹ “As we meet here today, American soldiers are fighting a bitter campaign in Korea...The threat of world conquest by Soviet Russia endangers our liberty and endangers the kind of world in which the free spirit of man can survive. This threat is aimed at all peoples who strive to win or defend their own freedom and national independence...[break]...In the months ahead the Government must give priority to activities that are urgent-like military procurement and atomic energy and power development. It must practice rigid economy in its non defense activities. Many of the things we would normally do must be curtailed or postponed...” See: Truman (1951b).

⁴² The Monroe Doctrine is associated with President James Monroe’s address on the 2nd of December, 1823 that forbade European powers from colonizing any of the independent states of the American continent or extending their domination there. See: “Primary Documents in American History. Monroe Doctrine,” <http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/Monroe.html>, retrieved February 13, 2009.

⁴³ See: “Theodore Roosevelt’s Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine (1905),”

<http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=56>, retrieved February 13, 2009.

⁴⁴ “Our interests and those of our southern neighbors are in reality identical. They have great natural riches, and if within their borders the reign of law and justice obtains, prosperity is sure to come to them...We would interfere with them only in the last resort, and then only if it became evident that their inability or unwillingness to do justice at home and abroad had violated the rights of the United States

interests might not be properly discernable, it severely limits them to a case by case analysis based on “degree of atrocity and upon our power to remedy it,” rather than a generalized war without end or a deliberately vague claim of war until absolute victory. Not only is there an element of instrumentalism involved in foreign intervention (“our interests,” “prosperity,” etc.), there are also barriers and limits placed upon having power to remedy it (unlike the post-World War II claim of “we will spare no effort”). The value of freedom at risk of being lost, as warrant is not highlighted, rather possessing freedom extends to moral outrage regarding foreign atrocities (“give expression to its horror”). Domestic concerns with human rights are given preference to foreign concerns (“own moral and material betterment”), unlike in the WWII rhetorical Master Frame, that assumed moral leadership.

The clear separation in the above speech between domestic and foreign concerns is also absent in the new era of wars without end (involving the WWII rhetorical Master Frame): not only would specific interests (including oil and resources) not matter in the framing of wars, no limit would be placed on the exercise of power in war, and the intervention premise explicitly stated above, “in some cases action *may* be justifiable and proper,” was altered to action justified and considered proper and urgent or the very survival of the nation would be threatened! In other words, WWII and post, the rhetoric of war involved a moral catastrophe requiring urgent action. What is also notable in Theodore Roosevelt’s speech is the relatively meticulous reasoning that accompanies the pre-WWII war rhetoric as opposed to the more cut and dry, and quite mechanical (memo type) WWII rhetorical Master Frame, which gives the impression that emotive appeals are merely plugged in as slogans without any attempt at contextual elaboration that might reveal genuine concern.

Another example consistent with this analysis is President Woodrow Wilson’s speech to Congress on the 2nd of April, 1917,⁴⁵ declaring war with Germany, which signified the U.S.’ entry into World War I.⁴⁶ In presenting the U.S. as a single champion of right, and not intimately or exclusively threatened, Woodrow Wilson presents the U.S. as just one among many equal players. He does not establish the U.S. as a righteous victim, nor is the enemy presented as a dangerous outsider. This ‘presentation of the self’ (Goffman 1999) is markedly different to the World War II rhetorical Master Frame where international issues take precedence over domestic affairs, the U.S. becomes the keeper of international affairs, and victim status for the U.S. is established with agency to achieve victory, the villain is clearly identified and devalued as worthy of contempt and moral outrage evoked at its actions. There is mention of other nations in this World War I speech, but only as standing by the

or had invited foreign aggression to the detriment of the entire body of American nations...[break]...Yet it is not to be expected that a people like ours, which in spite of certain very obvious shortcomings, nevertheless as a whole shows by its consistent practice its belief in the principles of civil and religious liberty and of orderly freedom...” See: Roosevelt (1904).

⁴⁵ “It is a war against all nations. American ships have been sunk, American lives taken, in ways which it has stirred us very deeply to learn of, but the ships and people of other neutral and friendly nations have been sunk and overwhelmed in the waters in the same way. There has been no discrimination. The challenge is to all mankind. Each nation must decide for itself how it will meet it. The choice we make for ourselves must be made with a moderation of counsel and temperateness for judgment befitting our character and our motives as a nation. We must put excited feeling away. Our motive will not be revenge or the victorious assertion of the physical might of the nation, but only the vindication of right, of human right, of which we are only a single champion.” See: Wilson (1917).

⁴⁶ War was declared by Congress on the 6th of April, 1917, which marked an end to the isolationism and Wilson’s promise to keep the nation out of war which was the reason for his reelection in November 1916. The campaign slogan was “He kept us out of war.” See: “World War I Timeline: 1916,” http://www.pbs.org/greatwar/timeline/time_1916.html, retrieved February 13, 2009.

United States as equal partners, not falling behind it as cheerleaders of its righteousness, there is therefore no assumption of U.S. moral leadership. The cultural theme of fair play that is clearly evident in the WWII rhetorical frame is amorphous in the above quote since actions are delineated, which the U.S. must be careful of, so as not to transgress, in other words, moral purity is not firmly established (“the choice we make for ourselves must be made with a moderation of counsel and temperateness”).

Compared to President Bush’s statement on 9/12/2001 stating “[f]reedom and democracy are under attack,” which gives the impression of a mechanized passion where master symbols are plugged into a speech without contextualizing their appeal to reveal any kind of genuineness of such evocation, there is context in this World War I speech that seeks implicitly to evoke emotions rather than mere mechanical plugging in of “buzz words.”

The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT): 9/11 and the World War II ‘Master Frame’

What follows is a comparison of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 12/8/1941 and 12/9/1941 speeches with President George W. Bush’s 9/11/2001 (see Bush 2001b) and 9/20/2001 (see Bush 2001a) speeches to reveal the use of the WWII rhetorical Master Frame by President Bush to introduce and promote the GWOT. Following FDR’s words, WWI comparison is presented as criterion together with Winston Churchill’s May 13, 1940 call-to-arms speech.

Claims and Grounds

GWB 9/11/2001: Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts.

FDR 12/8/1941: Yesterday, December 7, 1941, a date that will live in infamy, the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked...”

In the 9/11/2001 speech, GWB makes the claim that the way of life of U.S. citizens and their freedom has come under attack, grounding his claim in terrorist attacks that are described as “deliberate and deadly.” Similar in form to the infamy that FDR claims in his 12/8/1941 speech, grounding it in the Japanese attack, which is described as “sudden and deliberate.”

GWB 9/11/2001: The victims were in airplanes or in their offices: secretaries, business men and women, military and federal workers, moms and dads, friends and neighbors. Thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil, despicable acts of terror.

FDR 12/9/1941: Many American soldiers and sailors have been killed by enemy action. American Ships have been sunk; American airplanes have been destroyed.

In continuing to establish grounds for the claim, GWB details the victims as belonging to a cross section of American society and lists the magnitude of the “evil” in terms of lives lost, which makes it an act of infamy. This is similar to the WWII rhetorical Master Frame where FDR talks about many “soldiers and sailors” killed and

to establish the magnitude of the destruction lists ships being sunk and airplanes destroyed. The link to the cross section of American society is also noticeable in the repeated emphasis on “American” in the speech by FDR. This is consistent with the journey metaphor discussed earlier and its use for mobilization for total war.

Comparison Criterion

Woodrow Wilson 4/2/1917: American ships have been sunk, American lives taken, in ways which it has stirred us very deeply to learn of, but the ships and people of other neutral and friendly nations have been sunk and overwhelmed in the waters in the same way. There has been no discrimination.

In this WWI speech, the grounds for war are markedly different since the grounds are more global rather than local, the attacks more externalized than internalized with exclusive reference to the U.S. and therefore the infamy element is markedly missing as the “[t]here has been no discrimination” part of the speech clearly illustrates.

GWB 9/20/2001: The evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al Qaeda. They are some of the murderers indicted for bombing American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya and responsible for bombing the USS Cole. Al Qaeda is to terror what the Mafia is to crime.”

FDR 12/9/1941: The sudden criminal attacks perpetrated by the Japanese in the Pacific provide the climax of a decade of international immorality. Powerful and resourceful gangsters have banded together to make war upon the whole human race.

In establishing grounds to back up the claim of infamy GWB points to previous crimes of al Qaeda, associating it with the mafia. This is an almost exact replica of the FDR speech in which grounds are established through calling the Japanese “gangsters” and referring to their previous crimes as a “decade of international immorality.” The negative-other depiction of the enemy is clearly discernable.

Comparison Criterion

Theodore Roosevelt 12/06/1904: Ordinarily it is very much wiser and more useful for us to concern ourselves with striving for our own moral and material betterment here at home than to concern ourselves with trying to better the condition of things in other nations. We have plenty of sins of our own to war against.

Once again in this WWI speech, the infamy part is markedly missing while there is greater self-reflection compared to establishing the immorality of the enemy.

Winston Churchill 05/13/1940: We have before us an ordeal of the most grievous kind. We have before us many, many long months of struggle and of suffering. You ask, what is our policy? I can say: It is to wage war...to wage war against a monstrous tyranny, never surpassed in the dark, lamentable catalogue of human crime.

Winston Churchill's famous call-to-arms speech (13th of May, 1940) compares well to the WWII rhetorical Master Frame in establishing grounds for the war claim. Britain having attained a permanent war footing in 1939 before the U.S. officially entered the war, this similarity between Churchill's speech and FDR's speech makes structural sense. The claim that a "most grievous" ordeal is at hand is grounded through establishing infamy by claiming "a monstrous tyranny" that in its criminal nature has not been surpassed in human history. This parallels the grounds like the listing of past crimes of the Japanese by FDR or of al Qaeda by GWB.

Warrants

GWB 9/20/2001: Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign unlike any other we have ever seen...The civilized world is rallying to America's side....We're in a fight for our principles, and our first responsibility is to live by them...

FDR 12/9/1941: We are now in the midst of a war, not for conquest, not for vengeance, but for a world in which this nation, and all that this nation represents, will be safe for our children...we will know that the vast majority of the members of the human race are on our side.

GWB establishes warrants for war claiming that "civilization" is on America's side (civilization being a Eurocentric code word for racial superiority [van Dijk 1993]) that this "war" is about principles, which must trump all other concerns about it. This is identical to the WWII rhetorical Master Frame where FDR talks about principles ("all this nation represents") and that the majority "of the human race" are on America's side. Moral leadership is assumed in both speeches.

Comparison Criterion

Woodrow Wilson 4/2/1917: Each nation must decide for itself how it will meet it. The choice we make for ourselves must be made with a moderation of counsel and temperateness of judgment.

In stark contrast to FDR and GWB, Woodrow Wilson in this WWI speech does not warrant war as an absolute necessity, rather it is a "choice," nor does he claim that all the nations are on America's side.

Winston Churchill 05/13/1940: ...let that be realized; no survival for the British Empire, no survival for all that the British Empire has stood for, no survival for the urge and impulse of the ages, that mankind will move forward towards its goal...I feel sure that our cause will not be suffered to fail among men.

Winston Churchill's famous call-to-arms speech is materially close to FDR's speech (and GWB's speech based on the same rhetorical Master Frame). War (and victory in war) as solution is presented as a necessity for survival and for the sake of everything that "the British Empire has stood for." In building warrants for war, the world is assumed to be on Britain's side when Churchill equates what the British Empire "has stood for" as the "urge and impulse of the ages" (once again Eurocentric racist code words much like "civilization," which assumes superiority of the Anglo Saxon way) and "I feel sure that our cause will not be suffered to fail among men." There is a clear assumption of moral superiority and leadership.

Conclusions

GWB 9/20/2001: We will direct every resource at our command – every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war to the destruction and to the defeat of the global terror network.

FDR 12/8/1941: As Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy I have directed that all measures be taken for our defense...The American people, in their righteous might, will win through to absolute victory.

GWB 9/20/2001: And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists...

FDR 12/8/1941: We expect to eliminate the danger from Japan, but it would serve us ill if we accomplished that and found that the rest of the world was dominated by Hitler and Mussolini.

In establishing conclusions both GWB and FDR commit to total war (“direct every resources at our command...and every necessary weapon of war” and “all measures to be taken for our defense”) for total victory (“destruction and to the defeat of the global terror network” and “win through to absolute victory”). Both also establish the pursuit of other nations (Hitler and Mussolini) deemed to be similar to “you are with us or with the terrorists.”

Comparison Criterion

Woodrow Wilson 4/2/1917: Our motive will not be revenge or the victorious assertion of the physical might of the nation, but only the vindication of right, of human right, of which we are only a single champion.

In contrast to FDR and GWB, Woodrow Wilson in his WWI speech neither talks about total war or total victory, but a limited engagement (“the vindication of right”) and that limited engagement makes America a single participant and not one that divides the world up into a dichotomy of “you are with us or with the terrorists,” but “only a single champion.”

Winston Churchill 05/13/1940: You ask, what our policy is? I will say: It is to wage war, by sea, land and air, with all our might and with all the strength that God can give us...You ask, what is our aim? I can answer in one word: victory; victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory, however long and hard the road may be...I feel entitled to claim the aid of all.

Winston Churchill’s call-to-arms speech is closer in content to FDR and GWB compared to Woodrow Wilson’s WWI speech. Like FDR and GWB, a promise is made to deploy all resources for war, “with all our might and all our strength,” for the sake of “victory at all cost.” The world is similarly dichotomized with the statement at the end, “I feel entitled to claim the aid of all,” much like GWB felt “entitled” to have everyone on his side in the GWOT.

On 9/12/2001, President Bush summarized implicitly the World War II rhetorical Master Frame using the word “war” a day after 9/11 to mark the beginning of the GWOT:

The deliberate and deadly attacks, which were carried out yesterday against our country, were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war...The American people need to know we're facing a different enemy than we have ever faced...This enemy attacked not just our people but all freedom-loving people everywhere in the world. The United States of America will use all our resources to conquer this enemy. (Bush, 2001c)

On 9/20/2001, President Bush summarized explicitly, his use of the World War II Master Frame:

We have seen their kind before. They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th Century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions, by abandoning every value except the will to power, they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way, to where it ends: in history's unmarked grave of discarded lies... (Bush 2001d)

President Bush (on 9/20/2001) stated quite explicitly that these “terrorists” are nothing new (“we have seen their kind before”), which is a direct contradiction to the 9/12/2001 speech in which he stated; “the American people need to know we are facing a different enemy than we have ever faced.” World War II is evoked when the president states that the “terrorists” follow in the path of “Fascism, and Nazism and totalitarianism” a reference to Japan, Italy, Germany and Soviet “totalitarianism.” In other words, (decoded) the president is acknowledging that this latest war without end, the GWOT is a natural extension of World War II, and the Cold War. Devoid of the moral rhetoric, it confirms my claims about structural requirements and uniformity that necessitates wars without end.

The “New Pearl Harbor” that the practical war faction (as against the ‘sophisticated war faction’)⁴⁷ of the power elite, the *Project for the New American Century* were looking for long before the events of September 11, 2001, presented itself in the form of 9/11 and the war script that described U.S. entry into World War II, which was mainstreamed a day after the events of Pearl Harbor, achieved mainstream circulation again. Such a “translation” of Japan, Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union directly to the Jihadists was unarguably way out of proportion in material and manpower terms, yet given the WWII rhetorical Master Frame, it was “logical.” However, giving the Jihadists worldwide media coverage and presenting them as an equal opponent and granting them major enemy status, gave them a stature they not only did not deserve, but could never have managed by themselves regardless of the horrific events that were attributed to them.

Conclusion

The key to understanding the structural causes of wars without end lies in the intersection of history, biography and social structure (Mills 1959). The high manipulation potential of biographies enacted within a rationalized, bureaucratized society is successfully exploited by the elite through use of the media of mass communication to which they have amplified access, within a structure of permanent war that evolved in the U.S. post-WWII. It is in this intersection of history, biography and social structure that we can locate the sociological key to uncovering the causes

⁴⁷ Adapted from C. Wright Mills’ distinction between the ‘practical’ conservatives and the ‘sophisticated’ conservatives in his book, *The New Men of Power* (1948).

of wars without end. Further, its link to a global structure cannot be ignored, the “you are with us or with the terrorists” mentality, when it assumes a reality in the global arena plunges poor (so-called) underdeveloped countries in a cycle that ensures that they go from one humanitarian crisis to another, from one dictator to the other, and from one military coup to the next and their priorities are geared towards fighting U.S. wars and ignoring domestic needs as they construct a national security state to reflect the demands of these wars. The politics of fear, as Altheide writes, is paid for, “in blood and sacrifice by the weakest members of society” (2006:207), both intranationally, that is within the U.S., and internationally in the underdeveloped countries, and as Charteris-Black concludes, “[l]anguage-like the siren’s song can possess a magical quality that woos us to disaster against our will” (2005:212).

Further research is needed on rhetorical analysis of fear related presidential speeches in the interim period between wars, this needs to be explored together with a decoding of the war time speeches to fully uncover the structural connections that underwrite popular war constructions and describe the military metaphysics (Mills 1956) of the U.S. power elite. I have, in this paper, offered a starting direction for inquiry that unites various paradigms within sociological analysis; it is a beginner’s attempt at developing a methodology of using rhetorical analysis to uncover elite managed structural stasis or change and warrants further investigation and development.

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